Beyond the 'three dogmas of juvenile justice': A response to Weatherburn, McGrath and Bartels by Richards, Kelly & Lee, Murray
This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted/accepted for pub-
lication in the following source:
Richards, Kelly & Lee, Murray (2013) Beyond the ‘three dogmas of juvenile
justice’ : a response to Weatherburn, McGrath and Bartels. University of
New South Wales Law Journal, 36(3), pp. 839-862.
This file was downloaded from: http://eprints.qut.edu.au/65521/
c© Copyright 2013 University of New South Wales, Faculty of Law
Notice: Changes introduced as a result of publishing processes such as
copy-editing and formatting may not be reflected in this document. For a
definitive version of this work, please refer to the published source:
2013 Beyond the ‘Three Dogmas of Juvenile Justice’ 
 
 
839
 
BEYOND THE ‘THREE DOGMAS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE’:  
A RESPONSE TO WEATHERBURN, MCGRATH AND BARTELS 
 
 
KELLY RICHARDS* AND MURRAY LEE** 
 
I    INTRODUCTION 
In ‘Three Dogmas of Juvenile Justice’, Weatherburn, McGrath and Bartels 
identify three ‘assumptions’ or ‘dogmas’ about youth justice, on which they 
claim ‘juvenile justice policy in Australia currently rests’.1 These assumptions 
are: 
• that contact with the court system increases the risk of further offending 
(ie, is criminogenic); 
• that youth justice conferencing is more effective than traditional justice 
in reducing the risk of further offending; and 
• that young people spontaneously desist from offending or ‘grow out of 
crime’. 
After assessing the evidence in support of these assumptions, and finding it 
lacking, the authors suggest that what they see as the current ‘hands off’ 
approach to youth justice, said to be utilised in New South Wales and other 
Australian jurisdictions, should be reconsidered.2 Further, they propose the 
implementation of a new risk/needs assessment system that would identify young 
people at risk of developing ongoing offending behaviour at an earlier stage of 
their contact with the criminal justice system.  
It is extremely valuable to have robust critique and debate around youth 
justice policy in Australia. Clearly Weatherburn, McGrath and Bartels’ article 
was written in this spirit. However, given the influence that Weatherburn, 
McGrath and Bartels’ article may have on youth justice policy – particularly as 
the authors recommend the abandonment3 of these assumptions, and ‘life without 
                                                 
* Lecturer, School of Justice, QUT. 
** Associate Professor in Criminology, Sydney Law School, University of Sydney. 
1  Don Weatherburn, Andrew McGrath and Lorana Bartels, ‘Three Dogmas of Juvenile Justice’ (2012) 35 
University of New South Wales Law Journal  779. 
2  See also Natasha Wallace and Geesche Jacobsen, ‘Children Reoffend as System Goes Soft’, Sydney 
Morning Herald (Sydney), 28 April 2012, 1.  
3  Weatherburn, McGrath and Bartels, above n 1, 780. 
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the dogmas’4 – it is vital that further discussion take place on these issues. This is 
especially the case given that in the current political climate legislators and 
policy makers hardly need encouragement to implement punitive and/or 
unevidenced policies and practices in youth justice.5 Indeed, media coverage of a 
preliminary analysis of the data presented by Weatherburn, McGrath and Bartels 
was quick to conclude – perhaps incorrectly – that the New South Wales youth 
justice system is failing due to its being too ‘soft’.6 This media response indicates 
something of the possible unintended political consequences of proposals for 
youth justice policy reform and the need to be very precise about the arguments 
being put forward.  
In this context, this article aims to contribute to the emerging conversation 
about the direction of youth justice in Australia; in doing so, it seeks variously to 
challenge, clarify, build upon, and provide further context to a number of key 
points made by Weatherburn, McGrath and Bartels in their dismissal of the ‘three 
dogmas’ of youth justice in Australia.  
This article is divided into three parts. Part II critically examines each of the 
three assumptions about youth justice identified by Weatherburn, McGrath and 
Bartels, and the authors’ claim that these assumptions are ‘so widely accepted 
and so rarely challenged they might fairly be described as dogmas’.7 Part III 
considers whether these three assumptions can be fairly viewed as ‘the pillars on 
which juvenile justice policy in Australia currently rests’ as Weatherburn, 
McGrath and Bartels suggest.8 Part IV considers the way forward for youth 
justice policy in Australia.  
 
II    DO THESE ASSUMPTIONS CONSTITUTE DOGMAS? 
In this section, we critically discuss the three assumptions identified by the 
authors in turn, and consider whether they can fairly be considered ‘dogmas’ in 
relation to youth justice policy in Australia.  
 
A    Assumption 1: That Contact with the Court System Increases 
the Risk of Further Offending  
Weatherburn, McGrath and Bartels claim that ‘[t]he notion that contact with 
the court system is criminogenic underpins efforts to divert young offenders 
away from court’,9 and that this ‘dogma’ is based largely on labelling theory.10 
This is not entirely accurate.  
                                                 
4  Ibid 806.  
5  For example, both the Queensland and Northern Territory governments have recently committed to the 
implementation of boot camps for young offenders, despite the lack of evidence that boot camps reduce 
offending: see below nn 88, 89. 
6  Wallace and Jacobsen, above n 2. 
7  Weatherburn, McGrath and Bartels, above n 1, 779. 
8  Ibid.  
9  Ibid. 
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Rather, it must be recognised that in large part, adherence to youth justice 
policies that divert young people away from court are premised not on the belief 
that court increases the risk of further offending (ie, is criminogenic) but that it 
increases the risk of further contact with the criminal justice system. These are 
obviously related issues but they are empirically different. That is, the 
assumption is not about the court being criminogenic, but that contact with it 
increases the chances of a return visit. Such a return visit may have nothing to do 
with further offending.  
Research suggests that young people – especially highly vulnerable groups of 
young people such as sex and gender diverse young people,11 and young people 
on bail, in out-of-home care and/or from rural, regional or remote areas (and by 
extension Indigenous young people) – can easily become ‘caught up’ in the 
criminal justice system.12 This is not necessarily the result of increased offending, 
but because of the heightened scrutiny they come under once ‘known’ to the 
system.13 This is problematic not only because ongoing contact with the court 
system can have adverse impacts on young people, their families and the wider 
community (eg, affecting young people’s family relationships, educational and 
employment opportunities, and increasing government costs), but because it 
increases young people’s risk of detention.14 Young people diverted under each 
jurisdiction’s youth justice legislation cannot be placed in juvenile detention, 
either on a sentenced order, or on a period of custodial remand. Having 
diversionary measures in place thus not only reduces young people’s contact with 
the court, but their risk of detention.  
Even if court is not criminogenic in and of itself, as Weatherburn, McGrath 
and Bartels15 argue, detention certainly is.16 Further, and as discussed in more 
detail below, minimising young people’s contact with detention is a principle 
contained in a number of international human rights frameworks to which 
Australia is a signatory. The point here is that it is not solely (or even primarily) 
court processes that are deemed problematic in the youth justice sector, but the 
potential outcomes of court. This rationale is highlighted in particular in Victoria, 
                                                                                                                         
10  Ibid 780. 
11  Angela Dwyer, ‘“It’s Not Like We’re Going to Jump Them”: How Transgressing Heteronormativity 
Shapes Police Interactions With LGBT Young People’ (2011) 11 Youth Justice 203; Angela Dwyer, 
‘Policing Visible Sexual/Gender Diversity as a Program of Governance’ (2012) 1 International Journal 
of Crime and Justice 14. 
12  Lesley McAra and Susan McVie, ‘Youth Justice? The Impact of System Contact on Patterns of 
Desistance from Offending’ (2007) 4 European Journal of Criminology 315; Kelly Richards and Lauren 
Renshaw, ‘Bail and Remand for Young People in Australia: A National Study’ (Australian Institute of 
Criminology, forthcoming). 
13  McAra and McVie, above n 12; Richards and Renshaw, above n 12. 
14  Kerry Carrington and Margaret Pereira, Offending Youth: Sex, Crime and Justice (Federation Press, 
2009) 
15  Weatherburn, McGrath and Bartels, above n 1.  
16  Uberto Gatti, Richard E Tremblay and Frank Vitaro, ‘Iatrogenic Effect of Juvenile Justice’ (2009) 50 
Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry 991; see generally Edward P Mulvey and Carol A Schubert, 
‘Some Initial Findings and Policy Implications of the Pathways to Desistance Study’ (2012) 7 Victims & 
Offenders 407. 
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where only the court can refer a young person to a youth justice conference 
(known as a ‘group conference’). Under Victoria’s group conferencing scheme, 
young people can only be diverted to a conference if they are facing a sentence of 
a community supervision order or detention.17 In Victoria, therefore, ‘diversion’ 
via a conference does not involve bypassing the court process at all – so in no 
sense do policy makers assume the court appearance itself is criminogenic; 
rather, young people are diverted from the potential consequences of court. This 
is also the case in practical terms in other jurisdictions in which referrals to youth 
justice conferences can be made by the Children’s Court (currently all 
jurisdictions except Queensland). For example, in New South Wales, more than 
half of referrals to conferences come from the Children’s Courts.18 A similar 
situation exists in the Australian Capital Territory, where during 2010–11, 50 per 
cent of referrals to youth justice conferences came from the Children’s Court.19  
In summary, to assume that policies which minimise young people’s contact 
with court are based predominantly on a misunderstanding that court is 
criminogenic is somewhat reductive. Youth justice policy makers do not 
subscribe uncritically to the labelling perspective; rather, they are likely aware of 
the complex interplay of factors that make it difficult for young people to exit the 
court system once they come into contact with it, and which increase young 
people’s risk of detention. It follows that to assert that attempts to minimise 
young people’s contact with the court are based on labelling theory overlooks 
processes unrelated to labelling via which young people may be exposed to 
further adverse contact with the criminal justice system. We are not arguing that 
labelling is absent as a consideration in policy makers’ minds when they discuss 
diversion, but it is not as central as Weatherburn, McGrath and Bartels assume. 
Therefore, the authors’ claim that the notion that court is criminogenic constitutes 
a ‘dogma’ is not entirely accurate.   
 
B    Assumption 2: That Restorative Justice Measures Reduce  
Reoffending Better than Traditional Criminal Justice Measures 
Weatherburn, McGrath and Bartels claim that ‘[t]he assumption that RJ 
[restorative justice] is more effective than traditional justice in reducing 
reoffending explains why restorative justice occupies such a central place in 
Australian diversionary schemes’, and that this misguided adherence to 
restorative justice measures constitutes a ‘dogma’ in Australian youth justice 
                                                 
17  The Children, Youth and Families Act 2005 (Vic) enables a child’s participation in a group conference if 
the court is considering imposing a sentence of probation or a youth supervision order. Section 414 of the 
Act allows the court to defer sentencing for a period not exceeding four months so that a conference can 
be held and a report prepared for the court. See Department of Human Services Victoria, Youth Justice 
Conferencing Fact Sheet <http://www.dhs.vic.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/660272/General-group-
conference-factsheet.pdf>. 
18  Noetic Solutions, ‘A Strategic Review of the New South Wales Juvenile Justice System’ (Report for the 
Minister of Juvenile Justice, Noetic Solutions, April 2010) 52 [193]. 
19  Community Services Directorate, ‘Annual Report 2010–11’ (Community Services, ACT Government, 
September 2011).  
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policy. However, we are not convinced that restorative justice does actually 
occupy such a central place in youth justice diversionary schemes, or that its 
place in youth justice policy is based on its capacity to reduce offending.   
First, the claim that restorative justice ‘occupies such a central place’ in 
youth diversionary schemes is itself contestable. Youth justice conferences are 
used infrequently in New South Wales and some other jurisdictions.20 Indeed, 
Weatherburn, McGrath and Bartels’ own data show that less than seven percent 
of young people from the 1999 cohort received a youth justice conference as 
their index disposition (67.7 per cent received a caution and 25.6 per cent 
appeared in court). Noetic Solutions’ 2010 review of the juvenile justice system 
in New South Wales found that only about three per cent of all juvenile persons 
of interest in New South Wales are referred to a youth justice conference by 
police. The proportion of juvenile persons of interest referred to a youth justice 
conference is low for both male (4 per cent) and female (2 per cent) young 
people, and for both Indigenous (4 per cent) and non-Indigenous (3 per cent) 
young people.21 The review22 also found that police referrals to youth justice 
conferences vary significantly across Local Area Commands. This suggests that, 
for police at least, commitment to restorative justice measures occupies a more 
‘central place’ in youth diversion in some locations than others. Moreover, there 
are strict limitations on both the type and seriousness of offences for which 
young people can be referred to a conference. In New South Wales, for example, 
under section 35 of the Young Offenders Act 1997 (NSW), offences that cause 
death, sexual assault offences, traffic offences where the young person is old 
enough to hold a license, breaches of apprehended violence orders, and most 
drug offences are excluded. The ‘central place’ occupied by youth justice 
conferencing – in the youth justice system as a whole, or within diversionary 
schemes specifically – might therefore be understood as more conceptual and 
symbolic than practical. 
Second, in an ‘examination of the key juvenile justice legislation around 
Australia’, which aimed to provide ‘examples of the [three] assumptions’,23 
Weatherburn, McGrath and Bartels provide little evidence of a belief in the 
capacity of restorative justice to reduce reoffending. The sections of text from 
legislation and parliamentary debates that they cite in support of their argument 
contain few references to the perceived capacity of youth justice conferencing to 
reduce reoffending. For example, while the authors argue that ‘all three 
assumptions ... were invoked in the second reading speech for the Youth Justice 
Act 1997 (Tas)’,24 they go on to provide evidence of this claim in relation to two 
of the ‘dogmas’ (ie, that contact with the court system is criminogenic; and that 
                                                 
20  Noetic Solutions, above n 18, 15 [53]; Kelly Richards, ‘Juveniles’ Contact with the Criminal Justice 
System’ (Monitoring Report No 7, Australian Institute of Criminology, 2009) 52–65.   
21  Noetic Solutions, above n 18, 16 [54]. 
22  Ibid 16 [56]. 
23  Weatherburn, McGrath and Bartels, above n 1, 781. 
24  Ibid 787. 
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most young people grow out of crime). The evidence proffered in support of the 
remaining ‘dogma’ –that restorative justice is more effective than traditional 
justice in reducing reoffending – is as follows: 
The proposed legislation is designed to create a system based on restorative justice 
in cases where the harm needs to be put right. ... The legislation is based on young 
persons being held responsible for their actions, together with promoting the idea 
of diverting young people away from court in the first instance.25  
This demonstrates parliamentarians’ concerns about young people being held 
accountable, making amends and repairing harm, and minimising their contact 
with the criminal justice system – some of the same concerns that prompted the 
emergence of restorative justice measures for young people around Australia and 
internationally. However, the authors provide no support here for their contention 
that a ‘dogma’ about the capacity of restorative justice to reduce offending 
underpinned the introduction of this legislation.  
Indeed, for only two jurisdictions – Victoria and Queensland – do the authors 
provide any evidence of the influence of the ‘dogma’ that restorative justice 
measures reduce reoffending better than traditional justice measures on youth 
justice legislation. In Victoria, the capacity of the Children, Youth and Families 
Bill 2005 (Vic) to ‘prevent recidivism’ was to be ‘boosted by the incorporation of 
group conferencing into the bill … Group conferencing aims to … reduce the 
likelihood that they [young people] will reoffend’.26 In Queensland, one of the 
potential benefits of youth justice conferencing to the community is ‘fewer 
offences being committed’.27 The authors provide no further evidence in support 
of their claim that a misguided assumption about the capacity of youth justice 
conferencing to reduce recidivism constitutes a ‘dogma’ or underpins youth 
justice in Australian jurisdictions.  
This is not to suggest that such views do not exist among youth justice policy 
makers, practitioners and others in the youth justice sector; clearly, they do.28 
What the authors inadvertently highlight in their attempt to provide evidence of 
this ‘dogma’, however, is the sheer diversity of aims that legislators had in mind 
in implementing youth justice conferencing. As has been recognised elsewhere, 
the restorative justice movement, of which youth justice conferencing is just one 
manifestation, had numerous, diverse antecedents, and was premised on 
numerous, diverse aims.29 As the authors’ own examples demonstrate, some key 
aims of youth justice conferencing around Australia were: reducing government 
spending on youth justice; minimising young people’s contact with the criminal 
                                                 
25  Ibid. 
26  Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 6 October 2005, 1375 (Sherryl Garbutt), quoted 
in Weatherburn, McGrath and Bartels, above n 1, 784. 
27  Youth Justice Act 1992 (Qld) s 30(4)(d), quoted in Weatherburn, McGrath and Bartels, above n 1, 785.  
28  See, eg, Youth Justice Coalition, Submission No 24 to Department of Attorney-General and Justice 
(NSW), Review of the Young Offenders Act 1997 and the Children Criminal Proceedings Act 1987, 9 
December 2011.  
29  See generally George Pavlich, Governing Paradoxes of Restorative Justice (Glasshouse Press, 2005); 
Kelly Richards, ‘Rewriting History’: Towards a Genealogy of ‘Restorative Justice’ (PhD thesis, 
University of Western Sydney, 2007). 
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justice system; empowering victims and communities to participate in the 
criminal justice process; repairing the harm caused by youth offending; and 
holding young people accountable for their offending. Other key aims included: 
enhancing due process for young people; building community confidence in the 
criminal justice system; involving parents of young offenders in the criminal 
justice process; giving victims a voice; creating a system better able to respond to 
offending by Indigenous young people; and addressing some of the identified 
shortcomings of the traditional court system (eg, by giving offenders an active 
role to play).30   
For example, in introducing the new youth justice conferencing scheme in 
New South Wales, the then Attorney-General Jeff Shaw stated that: 
Conferences are focused upon the young person taking positive action to put right 
the wrong they have done. … At a conference, young people are required to 
consider and articulate what they have done, face their extended family and the 
victim, and actively participate in analysing and making decisions about their 
offending behaviour. ... The participation of the young offender’s parents or 
guardians is important as a means of empowering families to play a role in and 
take more responsibility for their child’s behaviour.31 
Restorative justice is thus premised on what might seem less tangible 
objectives than reducing reoffending, such as enhancing ‘accountability’, 
‘empowerment’, ‘participation’ and ‘voice’. Importantly, and as discussed in 
more detail below, many of these aims reflect normative concerns about how 
young people in trouble with the law should be responded to, rather than a 
predominantly empirically reductive ‘what works’ approach aimed at reducing 
future offending.   
Moreover, the growing empirical evidence now shows that restorative justice 
practices, including youth justice conferencing, have met many of these varied 
objectives. Weatherburn, McGrath and Bartels32 themselves acknowledge that 
restorative justice measures are popular with crime victims. As Sherman and 
Strang have identified, the evidence is fairly consistent that victims are more 
satisfied with restorative justice measures than they are with court processes.33 
Hayes and Daly34 demonstrated that while two thirds of victims who participated 
in a conferencing process believed the offender would again be in trouble with 
the criminal justice system, 90 per cent thought the government should 
nonetheless keep the conferencing system. This demonstrates that support for 
                                                 
30  See, eg, Young Offenders Bill 1997 (NSW); see generally Pavlich, above n 29; Richards, above n 29; 
Hennessey Hayes and Kathleen Daly, ‘Youth Justice Conferencing and Reoffending’ (2003) 20 Justice 
Quarterly 725. 
31  New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 21 May 1997, 8960–2 (Jeff Shaw).  
32  Weatherburn, McGrath and Bartels, above n 1, 807. 
33  Lawrence W Sherman and Heather Strang, ‘Restorative Justice as a Psychological Treatment: Healing 
Victims, Reintegrating Offenders’ in Graham J Towl and David A Crighton (eds), Forensic Psychology 
(British Psychological Society and Blackwell Publishing, 2010) 398; see also Don Weatherburn and 
Megan Macadam, ‘A Review of Restorative Justice Responses to Offending’ (2013) 1 Evidence Base 1 
for a critical review of the evidence about victim satisfaction with restorative justice.  
34  Hayes and Daly, above n 30, 757. 
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restorative justice is not inextricably linked with assumptions about its capacity 
to reduce reoffending. Restorative justice measures also meet many of the other 
aims on which they were premised; for example, by definition, they provide 
opportunities for a range of parties excluded from court processes to have a voice 
and to actively participate in the criminal justice process. Youth justice 
conferences have also been shown, on the whole, to be more cost-effective than 
court.35  
The point here is that while a perceived capacity to reduce reoffending was 
undoubtedly among the premises upon which youth justice conferencing was 
established, the appeal of restorative justice is much broader than this allows, and 
the commitment to it cannot be understood solely or even primarily as a result of 
a misguided adherence to this assumption. While Weatherburn, McGrath and 
Bartels are right to suggest that youth justice conferencing has become a taken 
for granted part of youth justice systems (although it should be noted that court-
referred conferences have recently been abolished in Queensland),36 these wider 
benefits no doubt form part of the enduring attractiveness of restorative justice 
measures.   
Thus while Weatherburn, McGrath and Bartels are correct in their summation 
of the evidence about the limited capacity of youth justice conferencing to 
significantly reduce reoffending (as has long been recognised in the evaluation 
literature on restorative justice measures),37 they incorrectly assume that the 
strong support for youth justice conferencing is premised primarily on a 
misguided assumption about its capacity to reduce reoffending.   
The authors also incorrectly state that youth justice conferencing (and the 
‘dogma’ that it reduces reoffending better than traditional justice) is ‘derived 
from Braithwaite’s theory of reintegrative shaming.’38 While the theory of 
reintegrative shaming and the practice of restorative justice are in some ways 
compatible39 – with Braithwaite even later wishing he had called his theory 
‘restorative shaming’40 – they emerged quite independently of one another, with 
restorative practices emerging at least as early as the 1970s,41 well before 
                                                 
35  Andrew Webber, ‘Youth Justice Conferences Versus Children’s Court: A Comparison of Cost-
Effectiveness’ (Crime and Justice Bulletin No 164, NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, 
August 2012). 
36  Legal Affairs and Community Safety Committee, Queensland Parliament, Report No. 18: Youth Justice 
(Boot Camp Orders) and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2012 (2012) 46.  
37  Jeff Latimer, Craig Dowden and Danielle Muise ‘The Effectiveness of Restorative Justice Practices: A 
Meta-analysis’ (2005) 85 The Prison Journal 127; Paul McCold and Benjamin Wachtel, ‘Restorative 
Policing Experiment: The Bethlehem Pennsylvania Police Family Group Conferencing Project’ (Report, 
Community Service Foundation, May 1998).   
38  Weatherburn, McGrath and Bartels, above n 1, 780. 
39  However, there are some critical differences. For example, while restorative justice is centrally concerned 
with repairing harm to victims, Braithwaite’s theory is concerned with reforming offenders rather than 
assisting victims: Kelly Richards, ‘Taking Victims Seriously? The Role of Victims’ Rights Movements in 
the Emergence of Restorative Justice’ (2009) 21 Current Issues in Criminal Justice 302, 309.  
40  John Braithwaite, ‘Restorative Justice and a Better Future’ (1996) 76 The Dalhousie Review 9, 15. 
41  Kathleen Daly and Russ Immarigeon, ‘The Past, Present, and Future of Restorative Justice: Some Critical 
Reflections’ (1998) 1 Contemporary Justice Review 21; Richards, above n 29.  
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Braithwaite’s42 theory of reintegrative shaming. While the parliamentary debate 
about Young Offenders Bill 1997 (NSW) makes mention of the theory of 
reintegrative shaming,43 to state that the theory underpins youth justice 
conferencing is Australia is ahistorical, and significantly overstates the influence 
of Braithwaite’s theory.  
Further, the authors’ claim that Braithwaite’s theory ‘suggests that diversion, 
with or without RJ, ought to be more effective in promoting law-abiding 
behaviour than stigmatising and degrading offenders (as courts are alleged to 
do)’44 is a misinterpretation of Braithwaite’s theory. The theory of reintegrative 
shaming posits that criminal justice processes that are ‘disintegrative’ (ie, 
stigmatising) are more likely to result in offending than ‘reintegrative’ (ie, non-
stigmatising) processes; it is not, however, premised on labelling theory. Indeed, 
Braithwaite openly refutes Tannenbaum’s famous précis of labelling theory – 
that ‘the way out [of increasing the risk of reoffending] is through a refusal to 
dramatize the evil. The less said about it the better. The more said about 
something else, still better’.45 Braithwaite states that: 
No statement could be more starkly contradictory to that which is argued in this 
book. We will come to the position here that, with certain qualifications, ‘the more 
said about crime the better’, that low crime societies are those that do ‘dramatize 
the evil.’46 
Thus the theory of reintegrative shaming has little to do with diversion. On 
the contrary, it stresses the importance of censuring offending behaviour. While 
Braithwaite47 argues that labelling theory helpfully highlighted the ‘dangers of 
overreacting to deviance that might be transient if left alone’, he also accuses 
labelling theory of fostering a ‘debilitating nihilism’. In other words, while it may 
be prudent not to overreact to some types of offending that may be transient if 
left alone, in many cases, intervention in the form of censure is precisely what is 
needed: ‘[w]ould it really be counterproductive to label as criminal a drug 
manufacturer who bribed a health minister to have a ban lifted on a profitable 
pharmaceutical, or to label a rapist as criminal?’48 Ultimately, Braithwaite argues 
– quite in contrast to diversion – that ‘societies imbued with the ideology of 
labeling theory will be excessively apathetic about non-trivial crime; to be 
effective against crime, societies need to be interventionist in a communitarian 
sense, to be intolerant of crime’.49  
Therefore while the theory of reintegrative shaming highlights the dangers of 
stigmatising criminal justice processes, it argues that such processes ought to be 
                                                 
42  John Braithwaite, Crime, Shame and Reintegration (Cambridge University Press, 1989).  
43  See, eg, New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 18 June 1997, 10493 (Ian 
Cohen). 
44  Weatherburn, McGrath and Bartels, above n 1, 780. 
45  Braithwaite, above n 42, 17.  
46  Ibid. 
47  Ibid 20. 
48  Ibid. 
49  Ibid 20–1.  
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made reintegrative. It does not argue that these processes should be done away 
with altogether via diversion.  
In summary, while Weatherburn, McGrath and Bartels usefully highlight the 
taken for granted nature of restorative justice measures in Australia’s youth 
justice systems, they significantly overemphasise the limited role it actually plays 
in most jurisdictions. Moreover, they mistakenly suggest that this is the result of 
its perceived capacity to reduce reoffending rather than its broader benefits and 
its reflection of broader normative concerns. Further, they mistakenly assert that 
restorative justice measures for young people are premised on a theory that 
supports diversion, whereas in fact the theory of reintegrative shaming neither 
necessarily supports diversionary measures nor underpins youth justice 
conferencing. It cannot be concluded, therefore, that the capacity of youth justice 
conferencing to reduce reoffending is a ‘dogma’ on which ‘juvenile justice policy 
in Australia currently rests’.50 
 
C    Assumption 3: That Young People Spontaneously Desist  
from Offending or ‘Grow Out of Crime’ 
The third assumption identified by Weatherburn, McGrath and Bartels is that 
‘left to their own devices, most juveniles grow out of crime. In other words, 
juvenile involvement in crime is for the most part transient and self-limiting’. To 
refute this ‘dogma’, the authors present data on reoffending by 8813 young 
people who had their first known formal contact with the criminal justice system 
(ie, caution, conference or court appearance) in 1999.51 The reoffending of this 
cohort of young people was followed for a 10 year period.52 The data show that 
57.6 per cent of the young people reoffended (ie, had a court appearance at which 
they were convicted of one or more offence) during the 10 years following their 
initial contact with the justice system in 1999. The proportion of the young 
people who reoffended during this time varied according to the type of initial 
contact they had with the criminal justice system; 53.1 per cent of those 
cautioned reoffended, compared with 60.9 per cent of those conferenced and 68.5 
per cent of those sent to court.53 The authors argue that these results ‘are hardly 
consistent with the notion that offending by juveniles coming into contact with 
the criminal justice system is largely transient.’54  
When it comes to rebutting the ‘dogma’ that most young people grow out of 
crime, however, Weatherburn, McGrath and Bartels are somewhat disingenuous. 
As becomes clear in their discussion of their data on young people’s commitment 
to offending, the question they are really addressing is not the ‘dogma’ they 
articulate at all. Rather, they are interested in the question of desistance of only 
those young people who come into contact with the criminal justice system. 
                                                 
50  Weatherburn, McGrath and Bartels, above n 1, 779.  
51  Ibid 801 ff.  
52  Ibid 802.  
53  Ibid 805.  
54  Ibid.  
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Indeed, they recognise that offending by those young people who do not come 
into contact with the criminal justice system is likely to be transient.55 This is an 
important distinction as it essentially means that the ‘dogma’ as expressed 
remains true – that is, it remains the case that ‘left to their own devices, most 
juveniles grow out of crime ... juvenile involvement in crime is for the most part 
transient and self-limiting’.56 Moreover, it remains true for 42 per cent of those 
who do come into the criminal justice system according to Weatherburn, 
McGrath and Bartels’ own data. To some extent, this refutes the authors’ claim 
that ‘[t]he evidence ... suggests that transient offenders have little, if any, contact 
with the criminal justice system’.57 Indeed, according to their own data, for 
nearly half (42 per cent) of young people who have formal contact with the 
criminal justice system, offending is transient.   
A number of caveats should also be borne in mind by policy makers 
interpreting Weatherburn, McGrath and Bartels’ data. One issue that should be 
considered when making sense of the data is the use of the mean number of court 
appearances at which a young person was convicted of one or more offences. It is 
obviously helpful to know the mean (in this case, four), and this measure is often 
reported in studies of young people’s contact with the criminal justice system.58 
Given that, it has been shown repeatedly that a small proportion of young people 
commit a disproportionate amount of offences;59 however, it is possible that the 
mean may be skewed. If this is the case, Weatherburn, McGrath and Bartels’ 
findings may obscure a group of young people who offend a small number of 
times (eg, two or three) but who could not be considered persistent offenders, and 
who may not be in need of intensive intervention. In light of this, it would be 
useful for the range and median number of court appearances resulting in 
conviction(s) to be made public. This would further assist those in the youth 
justice sector to develop appropriate responses to young people in contact with 
the criminal justice system.  
It should also be borne in mind that the mean number of court appearances at 
which a young person was convicted of one or more offences provides insight 
only into the quantity of young people’s recidivism; the nature or seriousness of 
                                                 
55  Ibid 800.  
56  Ibid 779. 
57  Ibid 800.  
58  See, eg, Grace Skrzypiec, ‘Young People Born in 1984: Offending Behaviour of Juveniles Apprehended 
at Least Once’ (Research Findings, Office of Crime Statistics and Research, Government of South 
Australia, 2005). 
59  Jiuzhao Hua, Joanne Baker and Suzanne Poynton, ‘Generation Y and Crime: A Longitudinal Study of 
Contact with NSW Criminal Courts before the Age of 21’ (Crime and Justice Bulletin No 96, NSW 
Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, August 2006); Michael Livingston et al, ‘Understanding 
Juvenile Offending Trajectories’ (2008) 41 The Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 345; 
Jayne Marshall, ‘Juvenile Offending Trajectories: A South Australian Study’ (Office of Crime Statistics 
and Research, Government of South Australia, 2006); Frank Morgan and Julie Gardner, ‘Juvenile Justice 
1’ (Research Bulletin No 6,Office of Crime Statistics and Research, Government of South Australia, May 
1992); Torbjorn Skardhamar, ‘Reconsidering the Theory of Adolescent-Limited and Life-Course 
Persistent Anti-social Behaviour’ (2009) 49 British Journal of Criminology 863; Skrzypiec, above n 58.  
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reoffending is unknown. Although it is unlikely that trivial offences feature 
heavily among the reoffending reported by Weatherburn, McGrath and Bartels 
(as court appearances, rather than cautions or conferences were used as the 
measure of reoffending), information about the severity of reoffending among 
young people would be helpful to youth justice professionals responsible for 
developing appropriate interventions for young people.  
It is also vital to take into account the social context of young people’s 
contact with the criminal justice system, and the realities of some young people’s 
lives that often fail to be recognised in quantitative analyses of young people’s 
reoffending such as that presented by Weatherburn, McGrath and Bartels. A 
number of points should be considered in this regard. 
First, in recent years, there has been increased emphasis on ensuring young 
people’s bail compliance in New South Wales and other jurisdictions.60 The 
NSW Police Force’s submission61 to the New South Wales Law Reform 
Commission’s review of the Bail Act 1978 (NSW) stated that bail compliance 
checks increased by approximately 400 per cent between January 2007 and 
September 2010. Although technical breaches of bail are not classed as offences 
under the Bail Act 1978 (NSW) (and therefore do not contribute towards 
reoffending data as is the case in some other jurisdictions), the intensive scrutiny 
of young people on bail is likely to result in offences committed by young people 
being recorded that may not have otherwise come to the attention of police.  
Second, research consistently demonstrates that young people in out-of-home 
care are over-represented in the youth justice system.62 There are numerous 
reasons for this over-representation,63 but an important reason to consider in the 
context of this discussion is that young people in out-of-home care come under a 
high level of scrutiny, and are vulnerable to having their ‘offending’ detected by 
police.64 As one stakeholder interviewed for Richards and Renshaw’s study65 of 
young people and bail put it, ‘young people in their family environment are 
disciplined by their parents, whereas young people in a care setting are 
disciplined by the criminal justice system’. Other stakeholders interviewed for 
                                                 
60  Anthony Dowsley and David Hurley, ‘Night Curfews in Victoria to Drive Down Crime’, Herald Sun 
(Melbourne), 17 August 2011; Noetic Solutions,  above n 18; Julie Stubbs, ‘Re-examining Bail and 
Remand for Young People in NSW’ (2010) 43 The Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 
485; UnitingCare Burnside, ‘Releasing the Pressure on Remand: Bail Support Solutions for Children and 
Young People in New South Wales’ (UnitingCare Burnside, July 2009); Katrina Wong, Brenda Bailey 
and Diana T Kenny, ‘Bail Me Out: NSW Young People and Bail’ (Youth Justice Coalition, February 
2010).   
61  NSW Police Force, ‘NSW Police Force Response to the NSW Law Reform Commission Paper “Bail – 
Questions for Discussion”’ (Response, NSW Police Force, 2011) 35.  
62  Katherine McFarlane, ‘From Care to Custody: Young Women in Out-of-Home Care in the Criminal 
Justice System’ (2010) 22 Current Issues in Criminal Justice 345; Philip Mendes, ‘A Structural Analysis 
of Young People Leaving State Care’ (2008) 3(1) Communities, Children and Families Australia 69–79.   
63  Judy Cashmore, ‘The Link Between Child Maltreatment and Adolescent Offending: Systems Neglect of 
Adolescents’ (2011) 89 Family Matters 31.  
64  Gretchen Ruth Cusick et al, ‘Crime During the Transition to Adulthood: How Youth Fare as they Leave 
Out-of-Home Care (Research Report submitted to the US Department of Justice, 2010).  
65  Richards and Renshaw, above n 12. 
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the study described working with young people whose criminal histories were 
comprised entirely of offences committed in group homes. One reason for this 
increased scrutiny appears to be the limited experience and capability of some 
staff to deal with young people with challenging behaviours, and the consequent 
reliance on police to resolve issues that occur within out-of-home care 
residences.66 Coupled with the close scrutiny of young people on bail, it is not 
difficult to imagine how young people in out-of-home care might rapidly 
accumulate numerous criminal convictions.  
Third, it has been suggested in the literature that some young people come 
under intensive scrutiny by the criminal justice system if they have family 
members with criminal histories: 
‘Criminal’ families may be more closely monitored by criminal justice agencies 
and social services, with the result that any transgressions are more likely to come 
to official attention than would be the case for other families who are not known 
to police and therefore unlikely to be subject to any official bias.67  
Fourth, research suggests that young people from non-metropolitan areas 
come under increased scrutiny by police in comparison with those from large 
metropolitan centres, as these young people easily become ‘known’ to police 
who work in small, sparsely populated areas.68 Coupled with an often poor 
service provision environment, this close scrutiny can result in young people 
from rural, regional and remote areas finding it impossible to exit the justice 
system.  
It therefore appears that certain groups of young people – including those on 
bail, in out-of-home care, from families known to the criminal justice system, 
and/or from non-metropolitan areas – come under a higher level of scrutiny than 
other young people in trouble with the law. While it may be the case that these 
young people are likely to reoffend (certainly it is the case that young people in 
out-of-home care often have histories of maltreatment that underpin their 
offending),69 it is also the case that due to this scrutiny, these young people’s 
offences are more likely to be detected and recorded. This context is important to 
recognise when interpreting Weatherburn, McGrath and Bartels’s findings.70 It is 
especially critical to recognise when considering reoffending by Indigenous 
young people that they are over-represented among young people on bail, in out-
                                                 
66  Ibid. 
67  Vanessa Goodwin and Brent Davis, ‘Crime Families: Gender and the Intergenerational Transfer of 
Criminal Tendencies’ (Trends & Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice No 414, Australian Institute of 
Criminology, May 2011) 3.  
68  Richards and Renshaw, above n 12. 
69  Anna Stewart, Susan Dennison and Elissa Waterson, ‘Pathways from Child Maltreatment to Juvenile 
Offending’ (Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice No 241, Australian Institute of 
Criminology, October 2002); see generally Lesley McAra and Susan McVie, ‘Youth Crime and Justice: 
Key Messages from the Edinburgh Study of Youth Transitions and Crime’ (2010) 10 Criminology and 
Criminal Justice 179.  
70  It is also important to recognise that the nature of the criminalisation of young people’s behaviour is not 
static, but changes over time. This also undoubtedly impacts the data on youth offending.  
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of-home care,71 and in some non-metropolitan and many rural and remote 
centres. In short, while it is concerning that more than half of young people 
reoffend, and are reconvicted on four occasions on average, it should be 
acknowledged that while some of this reoffending is genuine, in other cases, it is 
an artefact of measures employed by the criminal justice system and social 
service agencies. This is an important distinction to make, as it suggests that the 
policy response recommended by Weatherburn, McGrath and Bartels72 – ie, 
intensive intervention with young people deemed risky – may not be the most 
appropriate response.  
This view is supported by findings from the Edinburgh Study of Youth 
Transitions and Crime, a longitudinal research study of approximately 4300 
young people who commenced secondary school in Edinburgh in 1998.73 
Findings from this study show that even when controlling for a range of relevant 
variables, the strongest predictor of a young person being charged by police 
during the previous year was having previous police charges:  
Children who reported that they had been charged in previous years were over 
seven times more likely to be charged at age 15 than were children with no such 
history – a factor that is completely independent of their current involvement in 
serious offending and their more recent history of police adversarial contact.74 
McAra and McVie’s work therefore demonstrates that some cohorts of young 
people in trouble with the law – principally those known to the criminal justice 
system and/or related agencies – are subject to a higher level of criminal justice 
intervention than other young people with similar offending profiles: ‘selection 
effects at each stage of the youth justice process mean that certain categories of 
young people – “the usual suspects” – become propelled into a repeat cycle of 
referral into the system whereas other equally serious offenders escape the 
tutelage of agencies altogether.’75 
Statistics on young people’s patterns of recidivism should therefore not be 
taken as objective ‘truths’ about young people’s reoffending, but as a reflection 
of a complex interplay of factors including, but not limited to, the frequency and 
nature of the young person’s offending. The contention of the New South Wales 
Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research76 that ‘juveniles arrested by police ... 
tend to be among the more persistent of offenders (which is why they get 
caught)’ is therefore a limited interpretation. In some instances, young people’s 
repeat reconvictions may be a reflection of the intensive scrutiny that some 
young people – McAra and McVie’s ‘usual suspects’77 – come under following 
                                                 
71  Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, ‘Child Protection Australia 2010-–11’ (Child Welfare Series 
53, Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2012).  
72  Ibid 806. 
73  McAra and McVie, above n 12. 
74  Ibid 327 (emphasis in original). 
75  Ibid 319.  
76  New South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, Submission No 9 to Department of Attorney-
General and Justice (NSW), Review of the Young Offenders Act 1997 and the Children (Criminal 
Proceedings) Act 1987, 12 December 2011, 2. 
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an initial contact with the youth justice system. These young people may 
therefore not be intractable offenders in need of intensive intervention as 
Weatherburn, McGrath and Bartels suggest; indeed, for some young people it 
appears that intervention is central to the problem of subsequent repeat 
reconvictions.  
This does not necessarily mean that young people’s reoffending is not 
genuine, or that it doesn’t have serious consequences for victims and 
communities, or that it should be ignored or even tolerated. It does mean, 
however, that the recidivism of certain groups of young people – in some cases, 
the most vulnerable young people – will come to the notice of authorities more 
readily than that of others. While such differences can be obscured by 
quantitative analyses of reoffending such as Weatherburn, McGrath and Bartels’, 
they are important for those in the youth justice sector to understand.   
Finally, while the authors refute the ‘dogma’ that contact with the criminal 
justice system is criminogenic, the authors’ own data could be interpreted as 
demonstrating that contact with the criminal justice system has the effect of 
increasing the risk of future contact. In fact the authors’ data could be read as 
reinforcing the very argument that they seek to reject: that left to their own 
devices, most young people do desist, and that having contact with the criminal 
justice system will decrease their capacity to desist.  
 
III    ARE THESE ‘DOGMAS’ REALLY ‘PILLARS’ OF YOUTH 
JUSTICE POLICY IN AUSTRALIA? 
The authors argue that these three ‘dogmas’ (that court is criminogenic; that 
restorative justice reduces offending better than court; and that most young 
people grow out of crime) are ‘the pillars on which juvenile justice policy in 
Australia currently rests.’78 Further, the authors argue that collectively, these so-
called ‘dogmas’ underpin a diversionary or ‘hands off’ approach to youth justice 
in Australia.79 This section makes two related points in this regard: that policies 
of diversion for young people are premised on far broader concerns than these 
three assumptions; and that youth justice in Australia is premised on far broader 
(at times competing) rationales than merely diversion.  
First, it should be recognised that policies of diversion for young people are 
premised on much broader considerations than the three ‘dogmas’ identified by 
Weatherburn, McGrath and Bartels. Diversionary measures have been 
implemented in response to a wide range of offence types80 for both adults and 
                                                 
78  Weatherburn, McGrath and Bartels, above n 1, 779. 
79  Ibid. See also New South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, above n 73; Wallace and 
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80  See, eg, Garner Clancey and John Howard, ‘Diversion and Criminal Justice Drug Treatment: Mechanism 
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young people,81 in most western criminal justice systems. Although diversion is a 
key feature of youth justice systems in particular, policies of diversion are in 
general based on wide-ranging aims, including cost savings and ensuring 
efficiency of criminal justice processes. 
Fundamentally, in youth justice, the diversionary approach reflects the view 
that young people should be treated differently than adults, due to their limited 
life experience and maturity and also because they are likely to be more 
malleable to positive influences and interventions. Diversionary measures reflect 
notions including that young people deserve a second chance, a parsimonious and 
proportionate response, and a chance to participate and have a voice in criminal 
justice proceedings, as reflected in the United Nations frameworks that relate to 
youth justice.82 These are normative, not instrumental concerns.  
While Weatherburn, McGrath and Bartels attempt to demonstrate (with 
varying degrees of success, as described above) that the three ‘dogmas’ they 
identify have influenced the introduction of diversionary youth justice policies in 
each of Australia’s jurisdictions, their overview of the ways in which these 
‘dogmas’ underpin youth justice legislation is so narrowly focused as to silence 
broader normative concerns altogether. Thus although their overview aims to 
provide an ‘emphasis on examples of the assumptions ... especially in relation to 
the preference for diversion and RJ measures,’83 it cannot be said to provide an 
adequate ‘examination of the key juvenile justice legislation around Australia’.84  
Youth justice legislation around Australia clearly illustrates the wide range of 
normative concerns that policies of diversion are designed to address. For 
example, in introducing the Young Offenders Bill 1997 (NSW), the then 
Attorney-General stated that ‘the new scheme established by this [B]ill aims to 
ensure a measured and appropriate response to the range of juvenile offences.’85 
The introduction of the then Juvenile Justice Act 1992 (Qld) was premised on 
myriad concerns about the operation of the youth justice system, including 
enhancing accountability of young offenders, enhancing procedural fairness and 
consistency in sentencing, moving from a ‘welfare’ to a ‘justice’ approach to 
youth justice, and reducing Indigenous over-representation.86 For example, the 
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then Minister for Family Services and Aboriginal and Islander Affairs, Anne 
Warner, stated the following during the second reading of the Juvenile Justice 
Bill 1992 (Qld):  
The provisions recognise that children may be vulnerable when being dealt with 
by persons in authority, such as police and court officials. Diversion of children 
from the court’s criminal justice system is encouraged, wherever possible. 
Proceedings for offences should be conducted in a fair and just way, allowing 
opportunities for the child and parents to participate in and understand 
proceedings. It is imperative that children who commit offences must be held 
accountable and be encouraged to accept responsibility for offending behaviour. 
They must also be given the opportunity to develop responsible and socially 
acceptable behaviour. Decisions affecting children should be made and 
implemented in time frames which children can understand. Due consideration 
should be given to age, maturity and cultural background of children affected by 
this legislation.87 
Similarly, the Children, Youth and Families Act 2005 (Vic), which 
formalised group conferencing for young people, was premised on broad 
normative considerations, including ‘enshrining children and young people's best 
interests at the heart of all decision making and service delivery’ and 
‘encouraging the participation of children, young people and their families in the 
decision-making processes that affect their lives’.88 
As these examples illustrate, diversion in youth justice systems is premised 
on far broader concerns than the three ‘dogmas’ put forward by Weatherburn, 
McGrath and Bartels. 
Second, the authors’ proposition that the pillars of youth justice policy in 
Australia are premised on these three assumptions essentially reduces the 
complex patchwork of youth justice policy to diversion alone. While policies and 
practices based on diversion are unquestionably key features of youth justice 
systems in Australia, there are other (sometimes competing) measures that exist 
alongside this approach. Recent calls to introduce mandatory sentencing for 
young people in Victoria,89 and to repeal the principle of detention as a last resort 
for young people in Queensland90 and the introduction of boot camps in 
Queensland91 and the Northern Territory92 demonstrate competing approaches to 
young offenders – often premised not on diversion but on a populist ‘get tough’ 
mentality.  
Further, diversionary measures bypass some groups of young people in 
trouble with the law altogether. For example, in many jurisdictions, young people 
who breach bail conditions cannot be dealt with via diversionary measures, and 
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are instead dealt with via arrest.93 As has been documented elsewhere, more than 
half of young people in detention in Australia are on remand (ie, unsentenced).94 
The exclusion of these young people from diversionary mechanisms has been 
identified as one driver of high rates of young people on remand.95 Research has 
also found (as discussed in more detail below) that Indigenous young people are 
often not diverted and proceed to court more quickly than non-Indigenous young 
people.96  
The critical point here is that in reducing youth justice to three ‘dogmas’, the 
authors construct an image of youth justice as predominantly welfare oriented, 
and concerned with minimising young people’s contact with the criminal justice 
system at any cost. While minimising young people’s contact with the system is 
undoubtedly a key concern, as discussed above, this is not the sole thrust of youth 
justice systems in Australia. Rather, sound responses to young offenders are 
regularly under attack from, amongst other things, governments eager to 
implement populist, ‘get tough’ strategies that are likely to result in more young 
people in detention.  
Too often, approaches to youth justice, and we would include in this some of 
the suggestions from Weatherburn, McGrath and Bartels, tend to be instrumental 
to the point that they overlook the normative function of youth justice. Such 
approaches ignore the emerging evidence around normative regulation and 
procedural justice.97 This research suggests that confidence in the criminal justice 
system, which is strongly related to compliance with the law,98 can be best 
generated when those who come into the contact with the justice system clearly 
understand the processes they are engaged in, and are treated fairly and 
transparently.99 This is also in line with arguments made by Arie Freiberg100 who 
suggests the criminal justice system has to work on both effective and affective 
levels. While effective outcomes reflect the instrumentalism of incapacitating or 
deterring offenders, affective responses refer to the symbolic, expressive or moral 
dimension of justice.  
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In summary, this article argues that an appropriate approach to youth justice 
is one that takes into account both normative (ie, how should young people in 
trouble with the law be treated?) and instrumental (ie, what works to prevent and 
reduce young people’s offending and reoffending?) concerns. While 
instrumentally, an effective way to reduce youth crime in the short term would be 
to simply incarcerate all problematic young people, normatively, this would be 
unacceptable, as it is a disproportionate response and contravenes Australia’s 
international human rights obligations amongst other things. Basing youth justice 
policy solely on instrumental factors would undermine the critical normative, 
procedural and affective roles of youth justice.  
 
IV    THE WAY FORWARD 
We have argued above that in contrast to Weatherburn, McGrath and Bartels’ 
suggestion, the three ‘dogmas’ of youth justice they present ought not to be 
‘abandoned’.101 In this final section we consider the authors’ recommendations 
for a way forward for youth justice policy, and propose instead a renewed focus 
on primary crime prevention in place of the individualistic model they champion.  
Weatherburn, McGrath and Bartels argue that one way forward for youth 
justice in Australia is to identify potential persistent offenders through the use of 
‘risk assessment and needs assessment tools’102 early in the young person’s cycle 
of contact with juvenile justice authorities. That is, that young people should be 
screened for risk of reoffending ‘after two separate police warnings, cautions or 
conferences within some specified period’.103 They rightly note that the point of 
such intervention must balance a number of objectives of the system and 
rationalities of intervention. Moreover, the preliminary model they articulate 
does not appear to fundamentally rely on the disassembling or paring back of 
diversionary measures such as cautions and conferences.  
We have no essential problem with the application of a risk/needs assessment 
approach per se. Indeed, as critical authors such as Ward and Maruna argue, the 
approach can see the offender restored as the site of intervention as well as a 
return to rehabilitation under a set of evidence based principles.104 Moreover, 
such tools have been shown to be able to more accurately identify the types of 
programs that might be effective (or not) with specific offenders than traditional 
forms of subjective assessment. Indeed, O’Malley105 points out that such 
instruments are examples of where the mobilisation of risk can be much more 
‘optimistic’ than the original rather bleak visions of ‘actuarial justice’106 foretold. 
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Of course such instruments are not without inherent dangers, and much has been 
written about the problems of accuracy in regard to variables such as gender, 
ethnicity, and setting – as Weatherburn, McGrath and Bartels rightly concede.107 
With this comes the inherent capacity of such instruments to identify false 
positives and negatives, and the logic of risk suggests there may be a tendency to 
err on the side of false positives rather than the latter.108 Mulvey and Schubert’s 
prospective longitudinal study of 1354 serious young offenders in two American 
cities found that among this cohort, very few variables from the extensive array 
considered were able to independently predict which young offenders would 
persist which would desist.109 
More worrying though is the suggestion of moving this risk/needs assessment 
process further forward in the criminal justice process. As the authors suggest, 
this will no doubt have the effect of increasing the number of court appearances 
by young people. Such an increase is, however, constructed as largely 
unproblematic by the authors given their rejection of the ‘dogma’ that ‘contact 
with the court system is criminogenic’. As we have argued, this ‘dogma’ should 
not be rejected so brazenly. Moreover, while Weatherburn, McGrath and Bartels 
argue that ‘left to their own devices, human beings are generally poor judges of 
risk’110 in reference to police and courts and their capacity to direct an offender to 
an appropriate intervention, the real question is whether there is a place for risk 
assessment at this front end of the system. To our minds such an intervention is 
coming dangerously close to the forms of illiberal ‘pre-crime’ interventions 
negatively identified by Lucia Zedner.111 If, as we suggest, these ‘dogmas’ cannot 
be rejected in the ways the authors claim, such interventions could turn out to be 
themselves criminogenic.  
These interventions would also likely affect Indigenous young people 
disproportionally. As Cunneen112 has argued more broadly: 
One of the problems of this [at risk] approach in relation to understanding the 
relationship between Indigenous young people and juvenile justice is that the 
approach tends to focus on simple multi-factoral analysis which lists protective 
and risk factors found to be statistically associated with offending behaviour. 
There is a tendency to ignore the generative social processes that give rise to and 
exacerbate particular ‘risk factors.’  
Cunneen further problematises the still subjective nature of risk/needs 
assessment tools and how these tend to normalise the nuclear family while 
problematising as risks a range of lifestyle factors and living conditions that 
might equate closely with many Indigenous young people’s lived realities. As he 
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puts it, ‘[r]isk assessment represents the ascendency of “individualised” models 
of youth offending – the tools substitute individual histories for the historical 
dynamics of societies’.113 As a result of this range of criticisms, we would thus be 
extremely cautious about going down such a path.  
Instead, we want to emphasise an issue raised implicitly by Weatherburn, 
McGrath and Bartels’ article, but given little attention by them: that is, the 
importance of early intervention by way of primary crime prevention. In some 
cases, assessing young people’s risk once they have repeated contact with the 
youth justice system will mean waiting until it is too late. Evidence suggests that 
in some cases, children have ‘offended’ and are known to police before they 
reach the age of criminal responsibility (currently 10 years in all Australian 
jurisdictions).114 Kaila reported in the Sunday Herald Sun, for example, that data 
from Victoria Police indicate that in the five years prior to 2012, 288 children 
under the age of legal responsibility had been investigated for 305 serious 
offences: 
The statistics show 254 boys and 34 girls, aged nine and under, were processed for 
11 sex crimes, including rape, 36 burglaries, five counts of stealing a motor 
vehicle, three drug possessions, or using drugs, and three counts of being armed 
with weapons or explosives.115  
Further, Skrzypiec’s birth cohort study of all young people born in South 
Australia in 1984 found that the likelihood of being apprehended by police for a 
minor offence as a first contact increased with age; conversely, the likelihood of 
being apprehended for a serious offence as a first contact decreased with age.116 
Taken together with the evidence that some young people ‘offend’, sometimes 
seriously, before they reach the age of criminal responsibility, this suggests that 
early intervention by means of primary prevention is vital. As McAra and McVie 
argue, such an approach is also vital because of the potential for risk assessment 
tools to produce false positives, and because of the ‘danger that early targeting of 
children and families may serve to label and stigmatize these individuals and 
thereby create a self-fulfilling prophecy.’117 Further, while the evidence may well 
have improved around a number of tertiary interventions (eg, Multisystemic 
Therapy, Aggression Replacement Training),118 this evidence comes primarily 
from the United States, and there is little evidence that such programs have been 
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successful for Indigenous young people.119 For example, a trial of Multisystemic 
Therapy conducted in Western Australia was recently abandoned as it did not 
successfully engage with Indigenous families and had not achieved the results 
expected.120 This is an important consideration given the heavy over-
representation of Indigenous young people in the criminal justice system, 
particularly at the most severe end.121 Indeed, while there may be some 
justification for interventions to be focused on the individual, as Weatherburn, 
McGrath and Bartels propose, it is clear that early intervention in the form of 
primary, community-based prevention initiatives is also warranted.  
It has also been suggested in the literature that some young people have 
numerous informal contacts with police before their first formal contact,122 and 
that this may help explain what Cunneen calls the ‘bifurcation’ of the youth 
justice system123 – that is, the finding that Indigenous young people often bypass 
diversionary measures and proceed to court more quickly than non-Indigenous 
young people.124 How much of this informal contact occurs before young people 
reach the age of criminal responsibility is unknown. The data from Victoria 
Police described above suggest, however, that this occurs in some cases. This 
may help explain why ‘even those whose first known contact with the justice 
system was a police caution managed to accumulate an average of 3.6 further 
court appearances at which they were convicted of one or more offences.’125 It 
also again underscores the importance of early intervention via primary 
prevention, and raises the issue of the role of a wide range of service agencies, as 
described in more detail below.  
While it may be trite to highlight the importance of primary prevention 
strategies, acknowledging the need for primary prevention measures alongside 
the secondary and tertiary measures recommended by Weatherburn, McGrath 
and Bartels has important implications for the future direction of youth justice. 
Specifically, primary prevention is not the remit of statutory youth justice 
agencies in Australia; these agencies are responsible for supervising young 
people subject to youth justice conferencing, and/or under supervision (either in 
the community or in detention). It is therefore unsurprising that ‘most of the 
money spent by juvenile justice agencies goes on keeping young people in 
custody.’126 A key issue that warrants attention is the potential role of other 
agencies – such as child protection, health, education, housing, community 
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services and family support127 – in preventing young people’s offending and 
contact with the criminal justice system. If it is the case that it is too late to 
intervene in the offending trajectories of young people once they come into 
formal contact with the criminal justice system, and that young people are often 
dual or multiple ‘clients’ of these systems,128 then the role of these agencies in 
preventing this contact should be closely examined.  
 
V    CONCLUSION 
The aims of this article were to contribute to the emerging conversation about 
the future of youth justice in Australia, to highlight the importance of 
Weatherburn, McGrath and Bartels’ analysis (which calls into question some of 
the taken for granted assumptions of youth justice), and to urge that this analysis 
is interpreted cautiously and critically.  
We have argued that the three assumptions that Weatherburn, McGrath and 
Bartels critique cannot fairly be considered ‘dogmas’ of youth justice in 
Australia. In relation to the first ‘dogma’ (that court is criminogenic), we have 
argued that in part, the enduring adherence to diversion is premised not on the 
belief that court increases the likelihood of further offending, but that it increases 
the likelihood of further contact with the criminal justice system. Further, it is not 
primarily court processes that youth justice policy makers deem problematic, but 
the potential outcomes of court. These issues are especially relevant to groups of 
young people with highly complex needs, such as those on bail and/or in out-of-
home care, and Indigenous young people.  
In relation to the second ‘dogma’ (that restorative justice measures reduce 
reoffending better than traditional criminal justice measures), we have argued 
that while a perceived capacity to reduce reoffending was among the premises 
upon which youth justice conferencing was established in Australian 
jurisdictions, the commitment to restorative justice for young people cannot be 
understood as a result of a misguided adherence to this assumption. Rather, the 
wider objectives of restorative justice – including less tangible aims such as 
providing opportunities for ‘empowerment’, ‘participation’ and ‘voice’ – form 
part of the enduring attractiveness of restorative justice measures.  
In relation to the third ‘dogma’ (that young people ‘grow out of crime’), we 
have posited that this remains true – even for nearly half of those young people 
who have a formal contact with the criminal justice system.  
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We have also contested Weatherburn, McGrath and Bartels’129 claim that 
collectively, these ‘dogmas’ underpin or are the ‘pillars’ of the diversionary focus 
of youth justice systems in Australia. Diversion in the youth justice system, we 
have argued, fundamentally reflects normative, procedural and affective concerns 
about providing a parsimonious, fair and transparent response to youth offending. 
Further, we have argued that by constructing youth justice in Australia as a 
‘hands off’ model, the authors overlook the realities of other influences – 
especially ‘get tough’ strategies that inform the realities of some young people’s 
contact with the criminal justice system. We also have concerns, already 
reflected in media reporting of the authors’ work, that their characterisation of 
the system as ‘hands off’ can feed into an uncivil public debate and politics of 
law and order.  
As such, we have argued that while debate should be welcomed on the future 
direction of youth justice, in contrast with Weatherburn, McGrath and Bartels’s 
suggestion, the three ‘dogmas’ of youth justice that they present should not be 
‘abandoned’. Further, while we are largely unconcerned about the authors’ 
suggestion of implementing a risk assessment approach in general terms, we 
recommend that caution be exercised around their suggestion to implement this 
process early in the criminal justice process. While we essentially agree with the 
authors’ recommendation of intervening early in young people’s offending 
trajectories, we are wary of interventions that focus too heavily on individual 
young people and their families, given that such interventions may result in 
further contact with the criminal justice system – particularly for Indigenous 
young people. We urge instead a renewed focus on primary prevention measures 
aimed at the whole community, as well as on the potential role of a wide range of 
service providers in preventing offending by young people. We would agree with 
the conclusions made in the recent Edinburgh Study of Youth Transitions and 
Crime that ‘[t]he challenge facing policy makers and practitioners is to tackle 
[the needs of young offenders] in ways which are not stigmatizing and 
criminalizing and in ways which maximize diversion wherever possible’.130  
Debates about the future of youth justice in Australia need to be based on 
issues beyond instrumental assessments of ‘what works’; not only can such 
assessments be misleading, they can overlook a range of other normative 
principles that do and should underpin youth justice policy.  
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